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Summary  findings
Foroutan explores whether a systematic relationship  countries (North-South RTAs) or with other developing
exists between a developing country's participation in a  countries (South-South RTAs).
preferential regional trade agreement (RTA) and the  Nearly every developing country belongs to one or
restrictiveness of its trade regime.  more RTAs, so Foroutan develops criteria for
The motivation for her study is provided by the  distinguishing effective from noneffective regional blocs.
current debate about whether regional trading blocs are a  She then taps into many sources of data to compare
stepping-stone toward a more liberal global trading  levels of restrictiveness.
system and whether these blocs have changed over time  She finds no evidence that participation in a regional
so that the "new" blocs differ meaningfully from the  trade agreement necessarily leads to a more liberal
"old" ones in terms of openness to the rest of the world.  import regime.
She restricts analysis to reciprocal RTAs involving
developing countries in partnership either with industrial
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As regional trading arrangements (RTAs) have spread, enlarged and deepened over the last
decade, they have posed challenges  to economists on both intellectual and policy levels. On the
former, do RTAs stimulate growth and investment, facilitate  technology transfer, shift comparative
advantage towards high value-added activities, provide credibility to reform programs, or induce
political stability and cooperation? Or do they, on the other hand, divert trade in inefficient
directions and undermine the multilateral trading system?
The answer is probably "all of these things, in different proportions according to the
particular circumstances of each RTA."  This then poses the policy challenge of how best to
manage RTAs in order to get the best balance of benefits and costs. For example, should technical
standards be harmonized and, if so, how; do direct or indirect  taxes need to be equalized; how
should RTAs manage their international  trade policies in an outward-looking  fashion?
Addressing these issues is one important focus of the international trade research program
of the Development Research Group of the World Bank. It has produced a number of
methodological innovations in the traditional area of trade effects of RTAs and tackled four new
areas of research: the dynamics of regionalism (e.g., convergence, growth, investment, industrial
location and migration), deep integration (standards, tax harmonization),  regionalism and the rest of
the world (including its effects on the multilateral trading system), and certain political economy
dimensions of regionalism (e.g., credibility and the use of RTAs as tools of diplomacy).
In addition to thematic work, the program includes a number of studies of specific regional
arrangements, conducted in collaboration with the Regional Vice Presidencies of the Bank.  Current
and continuing work includes studies of several EU-Mediterranean  Association Agreements, a joint
program with the staff of the Latin American and Caribbean Region entitled "Making  the Most of
Mercosur,"  ASEAN Enlargement, and the Cross Border Initiative in Africa.
Regionalism and Development findings have been and will, in future, be released in a
number of outlets. Recent World Bank Policy Research Working Papers concerning these issues
include:
Glenn Harrison, Tom Rutherford and David Tarr, "Economic Implications for Turkey
of a Customs Union with the European Union," (WPS 1599, May 1996).
Maurice Schiff, "Small is Beautiful, Preferential Trade Agreements and the Impact of
Country Size, Market Share, Efficiency and Trade Policy," (WPS 1668, October 1996).
L. Alan Winters, "Regionalism versus Multilateralism," (WPS 1687, November 1996).
Magnus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko, "How Foreign Investment Affects Host Countries"
(WPS1745, March 1997)ii
Magnus Blomstr6m and Ari Kokko, "Regional Integration and Foreign Direct
Investment: A Conceptual Framework and Three Cases" (WPS  1750, April 1997)
Eric Bond, "Using Tariff Indices to Evaluate Preferential Trading Arrangements: An
Application to Chile" (WPS  1751,  April 1997)
Pier Carlo Padoan, "Technology Accumulation and Diffusion: Is There a Regional
Dimension?" (WPS1781, June 1997)
Won Chang and L. Alan Winters, "Regional Integration and the Prices of Imports: An
Empirical Investigation" (WPS  1782, June 1997)
Glenn Harrison, Thomas Rutherford and David Tarr, "Trade Policy Options for Chile:
A Quantitative Evaluation" (WPS  1783, June 1997)
Anthony Venables and Diego Puga, "Trading Arrangements and Industrial
Development" (WPS  1787, June 1997)
Maurice Schiff and L. Alan Winters, "Regional Integration as Diplomacy"
(WPS  1801, August 1997)
Raquel Fernandez, "Returns to Regionalism: An Evaluation of Nontraditional Gains
from Regional Trade Agreements" (WPS  1816, August 1997)
Sherry Stephenson, "Standards, Conformity  Assessments and Developing Countries"
(WPS  1826, September 1997)
Valeria De Bonis, "Regional Integration  and Conrmodity Tax Harmonization"
(WPS1848, November 1997) and "Regional Integration and Factor Income Taxation"
(WPS 1849, November 1997)
Eric W. Bond, "Transportation Infrastructure Investment and Regional Trade
Liberalization" (WPS  1851, November 1997)
Ferdinand Bakoup and David Tarr, "How Integration into the Central African Economic
and Monetary Community Affects Cameroon's Economy: General Equilibrium
Estimates" (WPS  1872, January 1998)
Other papers on regionalism produced by DECRG include:
Ahmed Galal and Bernard Hoekman (eds), Regional Partners in Global Markets: Limits
and Possibilities of the Euro-Med Initiative. CEPR 1997.iii
Bernard Hoekman and Simeon Djankov, "Imports of Inputs, Foreign Investment and
Reorientation of East European Trade," World Bank Economic Review (forthcoming)
Bemard Hoekman and Simeon Djankov, "The EU's Mediterranean Free Trade Initiative,"
World Economy
Bernard Hoekman and Simeon Djankov, "Effective Protection in Jordan and Egypt in the
Transition to Free Trade with Europe," World Development.
Bartlomiej Kaminski, "Establishing Economic Foundations for a Viable State of Bosnia and
Hercegovina: Issues and Policies".
In addition, Making the Most of Mercosur issued the following papers:
Alexander J. Yeats, "Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Raise Concerns About the
Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements?" (WPS1729, February 1997))
Azita Amjadi and L. Alan Winters, "Transport Costs and 'Natural' Integration in
Mercosur" (WPS 1742, March 1997)
Claudio Frischtak, Danny M. Leipziger and John F. Normand, "Industrial Policy in
Mercosur: Issues and Lessons"
Sam Laird (WTO), "Mercosur Trade Policy: Towards Greater Integration"
Margaret Miller and Jerry Caprio, "Empirical Evidence on the Role of Credit for SME
Exports in Mercosur"
Malcom Rowat, "Competition Policy within Mercosur"
For copies of these papers or information  about these programs contact Maurice Schiff, The
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20433.
L. Alan Winters
Research Manager
Development Research Group1. Introduction
The objective  of this paper is to explore whether  there exists a systematic  relationship
between a developing  country's participation  in an effective  preferential  regional  trade
agreement  (RTA) and the restrictiveness  of its trade. The motivation  for this study  derives from
the current debate on a) whether  or not regional  trading  blocs are a stepping  stone towards a
more liberal global trading system  and b) whether  or not there has been a change over time in
the characteristics  of such blocs whereby the "new" blocs differ meaningfully  from the "old"
ones in this specific respect. The analysis  is restricted  to reciprocal  RTA's involving  developing
countries  either in partnership  with developed  countries  (North-South  RTAs)  or with other
developing  countries  (South-South  RTAs). North-South  agreements  in which the preferences
are unilaterally  granted by the former  to the latter, such as the Lom6  Convention  or the
Generalized  System of Preferences  (GSP),  are therefore excluded.
Among  developing  countries,  it is not easy to find many  that have not been in the past
or are not currently  member of some kind of preferential  or regional  trading bloc. Virtually
every country  in Sub Saharan  Africa  and Latin America  participates  in at least one such
grouping, and many  belong to three or even more groupings.  Despite  this proliferation  of
trading blocs, however, not every bloc can be considered  as being effective,  in the sense of
playing a significant  role in shaping  the trade flows  and/or  policies of its members. It is
therefore imperative  to develop  criteria that allow  to decide  which of these blocs have been
and/or are presently  truly effective,  in order then to compare  their members' external  trade
regimes  with those of other countries  that do not participate  in an effective  regional  groupings.
Section  2 of the paper attempts  to do precisely  that. It looks  at intra-bloc  trade shares
and trade intensities  of the principal  RTAs involving  developing  countries  to see if any
systematic  trend could be detected  in the period following  the formation  of the blocs. The
existence  of such a trend together with the general knowledge  of various blocs is then used to
divide the countries  for which data are available  into two groups: those that belong or have in
the past belonged  to an effective  RTA and those that do not. In section  3 a number  of suitable
indicators  of trade policy are developed.  Sections  4-6 proceeds  to compare  these indicators  for
the two groups of countries  in order to look for any systematic  differences  that may exist
between  trade policy of the two group of countries.  Section  7 contains  the general conclusions
of the paper. The paper also contains  two appendixes.  Appendix  I provides a description  of
how trade intensities  are computed. Appendix  II contains  a brief description  of the salient
characteristics  of regional trade agreements  (RTAs)  whose  expressed  objective  has been the
promotion  of trade in goods and services  (including  factor services)  via preferential  treatment
accorded  to partners. The survey covers only the RTAs involving  developing  countries,
whether in partnership  with other developing  countries  or with industrialized  countries,  so long
as the arrangements  are reciprocal.  Thus, agreements  that grant unilateral  preferences  to
developing  countries  such as the Lome  convention  and GSP are not considered.l
For a recent  survey  of regional  groupings  see Harmsen  and Leidy  (1994).2. Classification of Regional Groupings
A partial criterion for discerning  effective  blocs from non-effective  ones is to look at
the liberalization  of intra-bloc  trade in goods  and services  (including  factor services)  in
comparison  with barriers to trade with third countries.  This exercise  requires accurate
knowledge  over a relatively  long period of time of the effective  implementation  of trade
agreements  signed by each partner and appropriate  data and information  may not always  be
readily available.  However, to the extent that effective  intra-bloc  trade liberalization  leads to a
relatively more rapid trade expansion  with partners, another  criterion  for assessing  the
effectiveness  of PTA is provided  by the pattern over time of intra-bloc  trade shares and trade
intensities.  An expansion  of trade among  partners  beyond  the level that would have occurred in
the absence  of an agreement  is a potential  indicator  of effectiveness.  This approach has the
advantage  of relying on trade data that are much more readily available  than information  on
intra-bloc  trade liberalization. Ideally, such a criterion  requires  some kind of a model, which
would measure  the "counterfactual"  trade and compare  it to the existing  level for each
grouping. One such model widely  used in the literature is the so-called "gravity model." 2
Because  the construction  and estimation  of such a model  for all the groupings  examined  here
goes beyond the scope of this paper, a regional  grouping  is judged as effective  if the data reveal
that the share and/or intensity  of intra-group  trade in the years following  the formation of the
group is significantly  larger than in the years before, and if there is enough evidence  from the
literature  to believe  that the increase  in trade shares/intensities  is not a pure statistical  artifact
(e.g. arising from a declining  share in world  trade) but rather the result of a genuine  increase in
intra-bloc  trade flows.3
This is of course a rough criterion. For instance,  the very expectation  of a positive
trade deal may already boost the flow of trade between  potential  partners even before any
formal  agreement  is signed (e.g. the US-Israel  FTA and NAFTA);  or the agreement  may be
quite important  for one or two members  of a FTA (usually  small  compared  to the group as
whole)  but not for others. In the case of several  groupings  in Africa, for instance,  the
agreements  appear to be significant  for one or two net exporting  countries,  especially  if only
manufactured  trade is considered,  but not for the group as a whole. This appears  to be the case
for Cameroon  in UDEAC, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal  in CEAO/UEMOA,  Kenya and
Zimbabwe  in PTA/COMESA.
Similarly,  partners in a particular grouping  may be expanding  their trade with each
other for reasons that might  be independent  of the formation  of the regional  bloc, such as faster
than average economic  growth or generalized  trade liberalization.  It is thus necessary  to purge
the growth in intra-bloc  trade shares of the influence  of such independent  factors. One way of
doing so is to consider  the trend in intra-bloc  trade intensity  alongside  with intra-bloc  trade
shares. 4 If for a particular  grouping  both indicators  show a systematic  upward  trend, then the
2For  a description  of the  gravity  model  see Foroutan  and  Pritchett  (1992).  For  a recent  application
to a number  of RTAs considered  in  the present  paper  see Soloaga  (1997).
In a completely  different  approach, Page (1996,  p.2) defines  a bloc as 'successful' or effective
if "it survives  and  ..develops  or evolves,  in  terms of its scope,  of its formality,  and perhaps
of the number  of members."
4Trade intensity  indices  deflate  changes  in the share of trade of two or more partners with  one
another  with variations  in their share in total world  trade. They  highlight  the importance  of
-3-presumption of effectiveness of the group is enhanced. This is the approach followed in this
paper. The shares of intra-group import and export trade in non-fuel products and trade
intensity indices for the period 1965-95 (averaged over five-year periods) are reported in
Tables 1-3.
Based upon the discussion above and the information contained in Appendix If, the
following groupings are considered as effective. In Latin America these are : CACM (in the
early years following its formation in 1960 and then again in the 1990s), the Andean Group,
and MERCOSUR (all since the beginning of the 1990s). 5 Since there is a flourishing of
bilateral or multilateral agreements in Latin America, the above list is likely to expand in terms
of countries it covers. However, most of these new accords are just too recent for their impact
on partner's  trade  flows to be captured by available trade data. In Africa, two groups could be
considered as effective: CEAO/UEMOA, especially during its early years, and SACU.
Zimbabwe,  Kenya, and Cameroon can also be considered as  belonging to an effective regional
grouping because as net exporters they have benefited from the regional trade agreements in
which they have participated, even though these agreements have had a negligible effect on the
trade flows of other partners.6
Among other prominent regional groupings involving only developing countries,
neither ASEAN nor GCC have thus far proved effective. In the case of GCC, the member
countries'  similarity of production and trade structures, as well as the their relatively open trade
regimes vis-a-vis the rest of the world account for the ineffectiveness of their RTA. In the case
of ASEAN, the lack of effectiveness is mostly attributable to the very limited trade concessions
given to partners.  The recent arrangements amongst the ASEAN members can in the future
lead to faster growth of intra-group trade, but these are still being implemented and are
therefore too new for their impact to be reflected in current data.
Among the North/South groupings NAFTA and Israel/US FTA are argued to be
effective.  The EU-Mediterranean initiative promises to have a profound impact on the whole
policy environment and welfare of the participating Southern countries. However, the initiative
is at its infancy for some and not yet ratified by others. It is therefore too soon for its effect to
be reflected in the available data.
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that there is another sense in which a
regional grouping can be judged effective. Although a regional grouping may be judged
ineffective based upon internal trade shares, in a policy sense membership to the group may
prove to be quite important. This is seen in the context of two groupings in Africa (CEAO and
UDEAC,  see Appendix II) where it is argued that  partnership in a regional bloc played a
crucial role in creating an extra layer of complex and distortionary indirect taxes (including
trade taxes).  Because, however, the intent of this paper is to relate policy stance to regional
group membership, using policy stance also as a criterion for effectiveness runs the risk of
seemingly  small  changes  in the trade of countries  whose  reciprocal  trade is relatively  small.
For the definition  of the index see Appendix  I.  For further  discussion  on the use of the
intensity  index see Braga et al. (1994),  Frankel  and Wei (1996).
5This is compatible  with recent  analysis  of the three  groupings;  see Soloaga,  op. cit.
6For further elaboration  see Foroutan  (1993).
-4-introducing a certain circularity into the reasoning. The impact, if any, of group membership
on partners trades policy is hence ignored as a criterion for effectiveness.
3. Indicators  of Trade Policy and Data Sources
In the absence of a unified all-comprehensive measure to gauge the
restrictiveness of a trade regime, the trade policy stance of a country is ordinarily
measured by a wide variety of indicators, including the incidence of non-tariff barriers
(NTBs)7, such as quotas, import license requirements, domestic content requirement,
and so forth; the height of tariff and para-tariff charges; a country's  commitments
under the GATT, including the level and share of  tariff  bindings; and the black
market premium as a proxy for foreign exchange rationing at the going exchange rate.
However, the multiplicity of these barriers,  some of which may be actually
redundant, makes it exceedingly difficult to construct an ad-valorem index of  trade
restrictiveness that is comparable across countries and over time. For this reason some
researchers have tried to construct other, more comparable measures of trade
restrictiveness. For example, in a  study of trade liberalization in Africa, Narasimhan
and Pritchett ( 1993) measure the evolution of the restrictiveness of  a  country's  import
regime  by comparing the gap between its actual imports and its notional demand for
imports. The notional demand is computed on the basis of the country's level of
income, real exchange rate and a set of pre-selected elasticities of import demand with
respect to these variables. In another study Nash (1993) uses a similar approach to
estimate changes in the "tariff-equivalent"  of multiple restrictions on imports in a
number of developing countries.
Given the very large number of countries and the long span of time, no attempt
at estimating  an overall index of protection is made in the present study. Rather, as
many indicators of trade policy as possible are employed and for as many countries as
data from a variety of sources allow. The data are summarized and reported in Tables
5-7. In these Tables the countries are classified not only according to their membership
in an effective RTAs, but also by region since important differences appear to exist
amongst various regions.
Table 5  reports  tariff and NTB data for all developing countries for which
such data are available. Columns I-IV of  these Tables report the (unweighted) mean
(MFN) tariff rate averaged over five-year  intervals for the period 1978-94. Columns V
and VI report the latest average tariff rate available together with the year to which the
latest data refer.  Columns VII-IX of the same Tables report additional information on
the structure of protection,  namely the maximum tariff rate, the number of tariff bands
and total other charges on imports. Since the latter information,  obtained from IMF
(1994), is missing for several countries, Columns X and XI provide additional
information on total charges (tariffs and other para-tariff taxes) on imports for two time
periods:  1984-87 and 1991-93. The latter information is obtained from UNCTAD's
Directory of  Trade Regimes (1994). UNCTAD is also the source of data reported in
columns XII and XIII of Table 5, which show the percentage of tariff lines affected by
For a comprehensive  list  of non-tariff  barriers  see UNCTAD  (1994).
-5-non-tariff barriers.  The latter information from UNCTAD  is not available for Africa.
The average rate of tariff  refers to unweighted MFN tariff for all products.
Unweighted rather than import-weighted tariff was chosen both because of data
availability and because import-weighted average tariff tends to underestimate the true
average protection rate. Also, the MFN tariff of a country is chosen to represent a
country's  general protection policy, that is, its  policy towards all countries that are not
in a trade arrangement with it. The choice of MFN tariff rate as opposed to, say, the
average overall nominal tariff  rate (i.e. the mean of tariff rates applied to third
countries  and partners) makes the ranking of countries by their protection rate
independent of their membership in an RTA.
However, because trade with actual or potential partners for some countries
belonging to an RTA is very large, Table 5 (column IX) also reports the most recent
average overall  tariff for countries that belong to an effective RTA. The latter is  the
weighted average of MFN tariff and  the duty applied to partners (assumed to be zero)
with 1995 import shares of third countries and partners representing the appropriate
weights. This exercise was done only for the most recent year for which both tariff and
trade data are available (usually 1995) for two reasons. First, because most regional
arrangements,  either amongst developing countries or between these and developed
countries, were not really fully implemented until very recently, or are still in the
process of implementation (this is particularly true for the Euro-Mediterranean
Association Agreements). Secondly, tariff  rates do not change very frequently so that
computing the average overall tariff for more than one year would not add enough
additional information to make the exercise worthwhile. Finally, although the European
Union's  free trade agreement with the Mediterranean countries is still in its infancy and
far from implemented, given the very large volume of trade that the latter conducts
with the EU, the overall hypothetical average tariff rate has nevertheless been
computed for the Mediterranean countries to assess the impact of such an agreement on
their overall rate of duty protection.
4. Integration and the Import Regine
What do the data reveal for various regions? Let us begin with Latin American
(LAC) countries. Of the twenty LAC countries that appear in Table 5 (parts A. 1 and
A.2), the majority (fourteen countries in all) are classified  as belonging to one or
another effective RTA. Only a few small Caribbean countries and Chile, which only
recently entered an FTA agreement with MERCOSUR, can be considered at the time
of writing as not belonging to an effective RTA.  Amongst the fourteen countries that
are now members of an effective RTA, the four member countries of CACM (Costa
Rica, El Salvador,  Guatemala and Nicaragua), and the five member countries of the
Andean Pact (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) have been in an
effective regional grouping since the 1960s. As discussed in Appendix II, the older
arrangements were initially successful at promoting intra-regional trade, albeit from a
very small base in the case of Andean Pact,  but ran out of steam in the wake of the
debt crises of the early  1980s.  The older arrangements were reinvigorated and new
ones were established in the late 1980s/early 1990 with the result that all fourteen
countries listed in the  part A. 1 of Table 5 can now be thought as belonging to an
effective RTA.
-6-The data show that the Latin American countries that are members of an
effective regional arrangement are also those that have liberalized their trade regimes
the most, to the point that on average, they now possess among the lowest levels of
protection in developing countries. Indeed,  a recent IMF survey (1994) lists these as
the only developing countries (among the 45 countries considered) where the overall
import regime could be classified as moderately, as opposed to highly, restrictive, with
the number of countries having a restrictive trade regime falling from 11 (73 percent of
the total number of Latin American countries) to only 2 (or  13 percent). 8
The data in Table 5 fully support these conclusions. For example, amongst the
Latin American countries, the larger ones such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, have
at least halved their average protection rate during the 1990s. The same pattern holds
true if total import charges rather than tariffs alone are considered.  Similarly, these
countries have drastically reduced the incidence of NTBs since the second half of the
1980s.  For the 14 countries listed in the  part A. 1 of Table 5,  the average tariff rate
has declined form 31 percent in 1981-85 to 13.8 percent in 1991-94 and further to 11.5
percent in 1995; the average of total charges on imports has declined from 45 percent
in 1984-87 to 14 percent in 1991-93 and the NTB coverage has fallen from an average
of  40 percent of  tariff lines  to less than 2 percent over the same time period.
The overall tariff protection in LAC countries that belong to an effective RTA
is even less considering the relatively high share of trade with partners. This is
especially true for  smaller countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay  and
Uruguay, which source one-third or more of their imports from regional partners. It is
also true for Mexico whose imports from NAFTA account for three quarters of all her
total non-fuel imports.
For LAC countries classified as not belonging to an effective RTA, recent tariff
data are more scarce. Besides Chile, relatively recent data are available for only
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The latest information for Guyana dates back to
1989, and for Bahamas and Haiti to even an earlier date. Any conclusion about the
trend in protection in these countries is therefore partial and subject to further
verification. On the basis of the available data, however, it appears that besides Chile,
the other countries have not achieved the same degree of import liberalization as in the
countries that belong to an effective RTA. The most recent average tariff rate in the
former group of countries (20.2 percent)  is twice as high as the average tariff rate in
the LAC countries that belong to an effective RTA (11.5 percent).
Table 5 also reports the same data for Asian and North African  countries
divided into four groups:  East Asia (part C), South Asia (part D), Middle East and
See IMF (1994),  Table  2, p. 37. According  to the IMF's definition,  the overall  trade regime  of a
country  is defined  as moderately  open if average  tariff  is between  11 and 25 percent  and the
import/export  coverage  of QRs  is 0-10 percent  with  high intensity  or 10-25  percent  with
medium  intensity.  The latter  notion  is defined  with  reference  to the "effectiveness"  of QRs in
restricting  imports.  Thus import  bans or prohibitive  quotas  are considered  as examples  of
high intensity  QRs  whereas  automatic  import  licensing  is and non-binding  quotas  are
considered  as low intensity  QRs.
-7-North Africa (part E) and the Gulf oil producers (part F).  None of these countries, it is
argued in Appendix II, belongs to an effective RTA. The data  show that on average
the South Asian countries have the highest level of protection of all the four groups,
and that despite some recent liberalization in  several countries, including India and
Pakistan, the average rate of tariff and para-tariff protection for the region remains
very high, indeed the highest among all the regional groups examined here.
In East Asia, other than Hong Kong and Singapore which, for all practical
purposes, have no tariff protection, the average rate of tariff  has declined substantially
to a relatively moderate level of 15 percent. The average protection rate, however, is
still above that in Latin American countries that are members of an effective RTA, and,
starting from a lower level, the decline in the average protection level is much less
dramatic than in the latter.
The Middle East and North African countries represented in Table 5 (part F)
appear to have implemented the least amount of trade liberalization. Except for the
recent reforms in Egypt and some degree of liberalization in the second half of the
1980s in Morocco, the average rate of protection does not decline in any other country
and remains at a high level of some 27 percent in the most recent year for which data
are available. The level of NTB coverage is also quite high and is expected to fall only
gradually if all countries fulfill their commitments under the Uruguay Round
negotiations of the GATT. Given the high volume of imports that these countries
purchase from the EU, the calculations in column IX of the same Table show that if
and when these countries achieve complete free trade with the EU, the impact on their
overall rate of tariff protection will be quite dramatic, leading to a halving of the
overall average tariff rate (from 22 to 12 percent).
The Gulf oil producing countries, as mentioned earlier, have always had rather
open import regime. The recent rise in average tariff rates, most notably in Saudi
Arabia, is attributable more to revenue needs than to protectionist motives.
In Africa,  few countries had undertaken any noticeable import liberalization
until very recently. Other than Ghana and Guinea, which according to the available
data had undertaken a serious tariff reform in the second half of the 1980s, the average
rate of tariff protection in all other countries  remains unchanged in the 1990s. The
most important reforms in African countries have occurred only during 1996, when the
seven UDEAC members as well as Benin (a member of UEMOA) drastically reduced
their average tariff and  simplified the structure of tariff rates and other indirect taxes
thereby greatly reducing the level and dispersion of the average rate of protection.
Despite these reforms,  however, the average rate of protection in SSA remains high, at
around 22 percent with little difference between countries that are classified as
belonging to an effective RTA and those that are not.
Finally, Table 5 (part B) also reports data on the three countries, Israel,
Mexico and Turkey, that are in a North-South RTA arrangement. The data show that
these countries have now a moderate MFN tariff rate, but that the reduction in
protection occurred in the first and second half of the 1980s, respectively, in Mexico
and Turkey,  well before these countries had concluded  any effective RTA with their
respective Northern partners, namely the US and the EU. The data also indicate that
-8  -even prior to 1985 signing of the FTA with the US, Israel  had  a relatively  moderate
tariff protection.
5. Integration and the  Uruguay Round
Other than the average tariff, for a limited number of countries there also exist
data on their commitments under the most recent Round of the GATT negotiations.
These data, which are reported in Table 6, show the average level of  pre- and post-
Uruguay Round (UR) GATT-bound tariff rates, post-UR average applied  tariff rates,
and  the percentage of imports which are GATT-bound. Once again the data show that
countries that are classified as belonging to an effective  regional scheme  (all of which
in Latin America) have reduced the most their post-UR bound rate (from 40.5 percent
to 32.7 percent, a reduction of 19.6 percent), even though the bound rate is still
significantly above the applied rate and higher than the average bound rate of the other
two groups of countries reported in Table 6. The first group of countries, however,  has
a much higher percentage of  its imports GATT-bound than the latter two groups
(almost 100 percent,  as opposed to 67 and 63 percent, respectively, in the other two
groups) and its mean applied tariff rate is much below that in the non-regional member
group (13.2 percent vs. 18.6 percent in the group of countries not member of an
effective RTA,  or 22 percent if Hong Kong, Macao anid  Singapore are excluded from
the latter).
6. Integration and Openness
For all countries classified as before, Table 7  shows the evolution of their
degree of openness over time, measured as total imports plus exports of non-fuel
products as a percentage  of their GDP.  To the extent that the growth in imports and
exports and hence the openness of a country  respond to trade liberalization,  a more
rapid increase in the degree of openness (which deflates growth in trade by that in
GDP) indirectly bears witness to the  breath and scope of a country's  trade
liberalization effort. Since data on trade flows are more readily available than those on
tariffs and NTBs, the information reported in Table 7 complements those in earlier
Tables by providing further evidence as to which countries have liberalized the most
their trade regimes.
The data demonstrate that in the first half of the 1990s the degree of openness
has risen the most in the Latin American countries that belong to an effective regional
scheme, the South Asian countries and the Northern African/Middle Eastern countries
(about 22 percent).  However, except for a few countries, most notably Mexico, the
degree of openness in the 1990s in LAC was still below its very high levels in the
second half of the 1970s, i.e. before the onset of the debt crisis. This is not true in the
case of South Asian countries where openness appears to have gradually increased over
time during the entire period considered. The same pattern is in other regions except
for Africa. In the latter, openness increases in the first half of the 1990s compared to
the previous five years, but despite this increase, openness in all  countries with the
exception of Mauritius remains well below its high levels in the second half of the
1970s.
-9-7. Conclusions
The  data and information collected from a variety of sources appear to indicate
that, excluding those countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore and the Gulf states,
which have always had a very open and liberal trade regime, the countries that are
currently member  of an effective RTA, namely  Israel, Mexico, and Turkey which are
in an effective RTA arrangement with the US and/or the EU as well as the Latin
American countries that belong to an effective regional grouping are also the ones that
have most radically liberalized their trade regimes in the past decade.
Does this finding supports a causality link between trade liberalization and RTA
membership? The answer appears to be in the negative for at least two reasons.  First,
given that LAC countries are those which have both liberalized the most in recent years
and also belong to effective RTAs,  it is difficult to separate the LAC effect form the
RTA effect. Secondly, and more importantly, over the time period considered, there
are examples of both liberalizing countries that did not belong to any regional
arrangements and member countries of effective RTAs that did not liberalize. Among
the latter the Andean Group and CACM countries in the early years of their formation
provide a good example. In the past, their participation in a regional grouping did not
lead to any overall trade liberalization . In fact, it is likely that the regional
arrangement was a sufficiently large obstacle to liberalization so as to induce Chile to
opt out of the Andean Pact to pursue its own reform agenda. Regrettably, the tariff data
in Table 5 do not go back beyond the late 1970s, when the two regional groupings had
already been established for some years,  so that a comparison between their pre- and
post- RTA tariff is not really possible. However, the data  show that  the Andean and
CACM countries'  trade regimes were still highly protective towards the end of the
1970s and early 1980s, namely several years after their establishment.  In fact, the
early wave of regionalism in Latin America was inward looking and import substituting
with import substitution at regional level replacing that at the national level.9
At the other end of the spectrum the data  show that several countries in all
regions of the word (e.g. Chile, Korea, Mexico and  Turkey, to mention a few)
significantly reduced their trade barriers without necessarily belonging to any trade
agreement at the time they undertook their trade liberalization measures. Even in the
case of LAC countries that are classified as belonging to an effective South-South RTA,
a closer look at annual data (on which Table 5 is based) reveal that they undertook their
liberalization effort just before the new wave of RTA revival in the early  199s and
continued thereafter.  Thus Argentina's average tariff rate was reduced from about 27
percent in 1987 to 20.5 percent in 1990 and to about 10 percent in 1991, the year
MERCOSUR was formed.  Similarly, Brazil began reducing its average tariff rate in the
second half of the 1980s, from some 50 percent in 1987 to 32 percent in 1990, 25
percent in 1991, and continuing to reduce it further  in the 1990s.  The data show the
same pattern also in Peru.  Uruguay and Venezuela, all of whom liberalized their import
regimes toward the very end of 1980s.
See Nogues and Quintanilla (1993).
-10-Thus, to the extent that any relation between regionalism and trade liberalism
can be established, it appears that the acceptance of a liberal trade policy may be a
requirement for the  survival and deepening of  a meaningful  RTA  whereas belonging
to a regional scheme constitutes neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an
open and liberal trade regime. This is particularly true in the case of (economically)
small partners in a regional grouping (e.g.  the developing partners in all North/South
arrangements)  which import heavily from their larger partners even in the absence of
any formal arrangement.  In effect it would be hard to believe that countries that are
highly protectionist  are willing to liberalize even a portion of their trade that takes place
with their partners unless they  embrace an altogether more open import policy.
-11-Appendix I: Definition of Trade Intensity Index
Trade intensity index (Iij) for country i's exports to country j is defined as the share of country j
in country i's total exports (Xij/Xi)  relative to the share of j imports (Mi) in total world imports,
net of i's  imports (M,-Mi):' 0
Iii = (Xii/Xi)/(Mj/(M,,-Mi))
The term Mi is deducted from the denominator to take into account that a country does not
import to or export from itself. In the above formula i and j can indicate a single country or a
group of countries. If i indicates a group of countries for which we desire to measure the
intensity of its intra-group trade for exports, then for intra-group exports, the intensity is
defined as:
Igx= (Xgg/Xg)/(Mg/Mw)
where lgx indicates intra-group export trade intensity; Xgg  and Xg are the group's  exports to
itself and to the world as a whole; Mg and M,  indicate, respectively, total group's  import from
the world as a whole and total world import trade. In this case no adjustment is necessary in the
denominator since (unlike a single country) a group does trade with itself.  If, however,  one
desires to compare intra-trade share with the share of the group in trade with the rest of the
world, then Xgg  must be deducted both from Mg and M,  in the denominator of the equation
above.  This adjustment is not done in the calculations that appear in Table 3. This is of little
consequence since, dealing with developing countries, Xgg  is a relatively small number in
comparison with both Mg and M,.  An import-trade intensity index can be calculated in a
similar manner.
The value Ij (or Igg)  varies between zero and one. A value of the index greater than unity
indicates that  country i trades with country j more intensely than does the world as a whole.
Vice versa,  a value of Ij less than one is indicative of a small flow of trade between i and j
relative to j's  trade with the rest of the world.
10 See for example Braga et al. (1994). See also Anderson and Blackhurst (1993) for a discussion
of  the index and its use in regional integration context.
-12-Appendix II: Major Regional Trade Blocs Among Developing Countries
North-South Agreements
Amongst the North-South agreements, all of which are considered effective in this
paper, three are of particular interest in the context of this paper: The European Union (EU)'s
recent Association Agreement with a number of Mediterranean countries; The North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada and Mexico; and the US-Israel Free
Trade Agreement of 1985.
EU's Mediterranean Initiative.1 Since the early years of its establishment, the
European Union has concluded a large number of trade agreements with developing countries,
either as a group or individually.  12 Until recently, however, virtually all trade agreements
between the EU and the developing countries were non-reciprocal in character, namely trade
preferences granted by the EU to its developing partners were not reciprocated by the latter.  In
contrast, the recently-launched Mediterranean initiative envisages the creation of a reciprocal
free trade or association agreement between Europe and the Mediterranean Region (MR)
countries,'3 requiring the latter to create,  within a time frame of 10-12 years, a free trade area
(customs union in the case of Turkey) between each of the MR countries and the EU for non-
agricultural products.
So far, the agreements with Morocco, Israel, and Tunisia have already been signed and
entered into force. Similarly, the Customs Union agreement with Turkey has now become fully
binding. Negotiations with another three Mediterranean countries (Egypt, Jordan, and
Lebanon) are at an advance stage and are expected to be concluded shortly.14 Given the very
large share of the EU in total trade of the MR countries, the association agreement with the EU
will have a significant impact on their external trade and protection policies, not only vis-a-vis
Europe, but also in respect to the US, as it is likely that before long the US would want to enter
into a similar agreement with the MR countries in order to preserve its market share and
strategic position. The Euro-Mediterranean Association agreements are therefore considered
very effective here.
The North  American  Free Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA)  15  The NAFTA Treaty signed
by Canada,  Mexico, and the US and which entered into effect on January 1, 1994, is
considered here an example of a very effective regional bloc because of its significant effect on
I  See  Harrison  et al. (1996),  Rutherford  et al. (1995), Hoekman  (1996),  Jbili et al. (1996),  Martin
(1997),  Nsuli (1996)
12  See EU Commission  (1996).
MR  countries  are Algeria,  Cyprus,  Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan,  Lebanon,  Malta,  Morocco,  the
Palestinian  Autonomous  Territories,  Syria, Turkey  and  Tunisia.
14 For the full text of the interim  Agreement  with Israel  see Com(95)  618  final of 29.11.1995  and
the OJ L 71/96.  For the agreement  with Tunisia  see COM(95)  235 final of 31.05.1995.  For
the agreement  with Morocco  see MA 24/10/95  - EM  I.
15See Arndt  et al (1996),  Casario  (1996),  Whalley  (1996).
-13-its member countries'  trade with each other, particularly Mexico's  trade with the US. Data in
Tables 1-3 show a considerable increase in trade shares and intensities of member countries in
the 1990s, following the NAFTA negotiations. The combined share of Canada and the US in
Mexico's  imports and exports which stood steady at roughly two-thirds of Mexico's  total (as
well as non-fuel) imports and exports between 1965 and 1990, increases by almost 10
percentage points,  respectively, in 1995.  A similar pattern is observable in the intensity index.
The latter which was roughly equal to 3.5 during the entire period from 1965 to 1990,
increases by 30 percent to a value of 4.3 in the 1990s.
US-Israel FTA. The 1985 free trade area agreement between Israel and the US was the
first such agreement between a developed and an industrializing country that envisaged full,
reciprocal treatment of imports by both partners, albeit with some concessions to Israel. In fact,
Israel was granted permission to impose extra protection for its infant industries against imports
from the US. The scope of infant industry protection was, however, limited by restricting it to
new industries that did not exist at the time of the signing of the agreement and by limiting its
duration to twenty-four months only. Moreover, its application at any time was restricted to at
most 10 percent of total imports from the US. Judging by its considerable impact on Israel's
exports to the US it is considered as an effective example of a North South regional trade bloc.
Israel's  share of exports destined to the US market, which until 1980 had averaged around 17
percent,  increases to above 30 percent in 1985-89 and remains at that level during the 1990s.
The FTA agreement appears to have had a much weaker impact, if any, on Israeli imports from
the US. This outcome was partly the result of Israel's obligation to extend to the EU any
preferences  granted to the US, and partly the result of its ability to limit these preferences to
protect its infant industries
Latin America
Attempts at regional integration and the idea of an eventual continent-wide unified
economic bloc date back to before the war.'  However, it was not until the 1960s when the first
regional groupings were created. Despite the rhetoric of unity and integration, however,  with
few exceptions, these initial groupings had a limited success at achieving their objectives.
Attempts at regional integration in Latin America were renewed with vigor towards the end of
the 1980s, after many countries underwent a period of structural adjustment and reform.
According to some estimates, between  1990 and 1994 alone, twenty-six bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements were signed among Latin American countries.'7 Many authors
refer to these initiatives as "open regionalism," or "open blocs" to distinguish them from the
past experience of "closed blocs."  The term loosely indicates a preferential trade arrangement
that is conducive rather than contrary to integration with the world as whole in so far as (a)
external barriers against third countries' imports are relatively low and do not increase (or even
decline in some cases) compared to that prevailing in member countries prior to the formation
of the bloc;  (b) regional preferences are meant to promote exports and ready the terrain for
more effective competition outside the region rather than protect import-substituting activities.
Other characteristics  of "open regionalism" are argued to be reliance on market forces rather
than centralized industrial planning and relatively little tolerance for "special protection needs"
16  See Battaler  (1995),  p. 27.
17lbid,  p. 31
-14-of member countries. 1 8
It is widely believed1 9 that most of the new and resurrected versions of older Latin
American regional initiatives have not only been quite successful at re-orienting the region's
trade towards itself, but also they hold the promise of being more sustainable and cohesive than
in the past. This is due both to the more liberal trade stance of the majority of Latin American
countries and the growing importance of manufacturing trade, and hence, increased intra-
industry trade opportunities in the continent. To the extent that regional integration schemes
that are based on intra-industry specialization and trade are associated with lower dislocation
costs of factors of production than schemes based on inter-industry specialization and trade, the
changes that have taken place in Latin American countries' productive and trade structures in
the past three decades are now believed to be much more conducive to a lasting and cohesive
regional  integration than it was the case during the first wave of such initiatives in the 1960s.  20
Below the major Latin American RTAs are briefly reviewed.
Central American Common Market (CA  CM).  CACM was founded in 1960 with the
participation of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The objective
of CACM was to establish a common market with a common external tariff. Although internal
friction largely prevented the full achievement of this goal, the formation of the common
market is believed to have had a significant initial impact on intra-group trade  (Tables  1-3).
The initial impact was, however, tapered off during the debt crises of the 1980s. In the early
1990s, under more stable political conditions and with more open economic policies in the
member countries, a series of initiatives were adopted to revive CACM as a more open and
liberal trading bloc.  This renewed effort at integration has resulted in a dramatic growth in
intra-CACM trade and trade intensity from the low levels of the post-debt crisis period
The Andean Pact.  The Andean pact was established in 1969 with the participation of
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Chile later left the Pact in 1976. The
objective of the Pact was to enlarge the small domestic markets of member countries and
21 promote their industrial development via regional import substitution.  The Pact, however, had
a very limited impact on the trade orientation of its members in its initial years.  Similar to
CACM and reflecting the changes that had occurred in the interim at the national level, the
Andean Group began a process of renewal in the late 1980s- early  1990s aimed at transforming
the group into a relatively open and liberal regional bloc.  These changes appear to have
exerted a very strong impact on the level and intensity of their internal trade  (see Tables 1-3).
Latin American Free Trade Area  (LAFTA). LAFTA was founded in 1960 by Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela,
with the aim of promoting the member countries' industrial growth behind regional protective
barriers.  In 1980 its name changed to the Latin American Integration Association or LAIA.
18For  a discussion  on the meaning  of open blocs  or open regionalism  see Gana  (1994), Rosenthal
(1994) and Salgado (1995).
Ibid.
See Braga, Safadi and Yeats, op. cit. for further discussion and quantification of changes in the
trade and production patterns of Latin American countries.
21 See Salgado (1995), p. 70-71.
-15-Although aggregate data suggest that LAIA's internal trade has been on a marked rise in the
1990s, it should be pointed out that since all members of LAIA already belong to another
grouping (ANDEAN,  G-3 and MERCOSUR) all of which are sub-grouping of LAIA, the
increase in intra-LAIA trade since 1990 is attributable to the formation and/or revival of these
other, smaller groups within LAIA than to LAIA itself.  This conclusion is supported by a more
careful analysis of the data  which show that once the impact of other smaller blocs is taken
into account, LAIA has had no positive effect on member's internal trade with each other.
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM).22 CARICOM was
established in July 1973 with the participation of Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize,  Dominica, Grenada,  Guyana, Jamaica, Monserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis,  St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and Grenadines,  Trinidad and Tobago. Given the limited potential for economic
integration among such economically minuscule nations with similar production and trade
patterns,  CARICOM appears to have had only a very limited impact on the trade patterns of its
members and is not considered as an effective regional grouping in this paper.
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR). MERCOSUR was created in 1991 as a
customs union by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Since 1996 Bolivia and Chile have
become associate members of MERCOSUR by entering into an FTA agreement with its
founding members.  Since its creation, all MERCOSUR countries have seen a surge in the
share of their internal trade that bears witness to the influence of the preferential arrangement.
Based on the trend in internal trade and several recent studies on the impact of MERCOSUR in
the literature,23 it is taken as an example of one of the most effective regional groupings in
Latin America.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Together with Latin America, SSA has the highest number of regional groupings in the
developing world, with often overlapping membership and objectives that vary from limited
cooperation in specific areas to full fledged economic integration.  Some of the regional
grouping in SSA  --such as the Eastern African Community which is just now being revived
again, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and the French Franc Zone groupings--
date back to the colonial era. However, most of the integration schemes were adopted after
independence during the late  1960s and 1970s. In many instances, the groupings comprised
countries, which had shared colonial ties to the same foreign power because the colonial ties
had created a host of common institutions, a common official language, and a common
currency. In other instances, the regional groupings, notably the larger ones, were more in line
with the geographic proximity of the member countries.
Despite the proliferation of regional groupings in Africa,  it appears from the growth of
intra-regional trade shares that in most instances they have achieved little by the way of
promoting regional trade integration.24 Data in Tables 1-3 show that no group has been
22 For details  on recent  developments  see CARICOM  Secretariat  (1995a)  and (1995b).  See  also
Lewis  (1995) and Serbin  (1994).
23 See Yeats  (1997), Braga  et. a] (1994),  and Soloaga  (1997).
24 A notable  exception  is SACU.  For details  see below.
-16-successful at elevating intra-regional trade beyond a negligible portion of Africa's total trade.
The data also show that until the beginning of the 1990s the internal trade shares of almost
every African grouping either remained constant or actually decreased to below their level
prior to the formation of the groups. This pattern is also apparent from trade intensity indices
for African groupings. For example, the intensity index for the Preferential Trade Area of
Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) during 1985-89, i.e. four years after the formation of the
group, was lower than in 1975-79, i.e. five years before its formation (Table 3). During the
1990s, however,  the data show a slight increase in the level, and a much bigger increase in the
intensity, of intra-African trade.  This result, however,  is almost entirely attributable to the huge
decline in the share of Africa in total world trade in the past thirty years,  a trend that continued
unabated during the 1990s. All groupings saw their share in total world trade decline by at least
one half and more often by two-thirds of its original value (see Table 4).  Now, given the
definition of trade intensity (see Appendix 1), a decline in the share of trade of a group in total
world trade necessarily results in an increase in trade intensity in the face of steady or less
steeply declining trade shares with partners.
Based upon the above discussion and the trend over time in intra-group trade shares
and intensity indices, it is argued here that most of African groupings have been ineffective.
This is probably particularly true for the larger groupings such as ECOWAS and PTA. There is
then some of the more recent initiatives, most notably the CBI and the renewed versions of
SADC, UEMOA and UDEAC that are too new for their impact, if any, on the internal trade of
the participating members to be captured by the available data. This leaves one with a few
regional groupings in the continent that can have any pretense at effectiveness. Among these,
SACU is the oldest and by all accounts the most effective grouping in SSA.
Although separate trade data do not exist for a long enough period for the member
states separately to test the impact of SACU on their trade flows, it is by most observers
accepted that the trade and revenue arrangements among SACU countries as well as their
monetary arrangement has had a considerable impact on the economies of the smaller members
that goes beyond their external trade. Similarly, it can be argued that the bilateral agreements
between Zimbabwe with South Africa and other SACU states have been more or less effective
for the former.
Amongst the remaining, older groupings there is some evidence that both CEAO and
UDEAC have been to some extent "effective," not solely, or not so much, in terms of their
impact on the overall internal trade shares, but also in terms of their implication for the trade
policy of their member states. Until the recent attempts at renewal of the two groupings, it
appears that membership to these regional arrangements added another layer of complexity and
distortion to the members'  trade and indirect tax systems.25  Thus, in a sense, membership in
these regional groupings  was effective, albeit in a negative sense. Finally, and additionally,
there exists some evidence from two separate sets of estimates of a gravity model  2 6 that CEAO,
especially in its early years, did exercise a statistically significant impact on the level of
members' trade  with each other. Below the major groupings in Africa are briefly discussed.
25 Here I refer  to two indirtect  taxes, the so-called  Taxe  de Cooperation  regionale  in CEAO  and
the Taxe Unique in UDEAC, both of which have been recently abrogated. For details see
Foroutan (1993).
26 See ibid and Foroutan and Pritchett (1993).
-17-Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), was established in 1975
with the participation of fifteen countries: the seven members of CEAO, namely Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire,  Mali, Mauritania, Niger,  Senegal; the three members of MRU,
namely Guinea, Liberia. and Sierra Leon, plus Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau,
Nigeria and Togo. Cape Verde joined shortly thereafter.  Despite its declared objective of
creating an economic community, it has not to date succeeded to liberalize trade in goods, let
alone factor services, among its members. In this paper ECOWAS is considered an ineffective
regional bloc.
Communaute Economigue de I'Afrigue  Occidentale (CEAO)/Union Economigue et
Monaitaire de l'Afrigue Occidentale (UEMOA).  CEAO was created by the Treaty of Abidjan
in 1973 with six members:  Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire,  Mali, Mauritania,  Niger, and
Senegal. Benin became a member in 1984. All of the member countries except for Mauritania
belong to the French franc zone and are also members of the West African Monetary Union
(Union Monetaire de l'Afrique  Occidentale, UMOA). Mauritania's currency is also pegged to
the French franc and is convertible with CFA at a fixed parity.  In early 1990s, and facilitated
by the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, CEAO was replaced by a new initiative,
UEMOA, intended to strengthen the process of  integration amongst the members.
Union Duaniere et Economigue d'Afrigue Centrale (UDEAC). UDEAC was founded in
1996 by the former  French West African colonies of Cameroon, the Central African Republic
(CAR), Chad,  Congo and Gabon. Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony, acceded to the
union in 1985. Alongside the wave of new regional initiatives in Africa and elsewhere, in the
early  1990s UDEAC countries also launched a process of renewal of the union. Its aim was to
replace the existing complex and distorted system of external and internal taxes with a
simplified and transparent one, similar to the one being considered by CEAO members.
Communaute Economigue des Pays des Grands Lacs  (CEPGL). CEPGL was founded
in 1976 by Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire. The outbreak of civil unrest in Rwanda and Burundi,
and most recently in Zaire, has stalled any progress towards economic integration.
The Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa  (COMESA)/Preferential Trade
Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA).  PTA was  founded in December 1981
and by the early  1990s,  its membership had expanded to eighteen countries in the region:
Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibuti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique,  Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania,  Zambia and
Zimbabwe.  Dissatisfaction with PTA's  progress and the new wave of regionalism in the
continent led PTA members (joined by Madagascar and Mauritius) to draw up a new treaty
establishing COMESA in December 1993. The new regional grouping became effective and
replaced the PTA in December 1994.
Southern African Development Coordination Conference  (SADC)/ The Southern
African Development Community (SADCC). 2 7 SADCC was created in April 1980 to reduce
the dependence of the region on South Africa and to seek foreign financial support for
development projects that could not economically be undertaken by any one of its member
27 For recent developments see Lindeke (1996), Holden (1996).
-18-countries individually. SADCC's  original members included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Swaziland. Namibia joined the
Community in 1990, after independence. After the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa
in 1992, SADCC was replace by SADC, yet another preferential trade grouping in the region.
South Africa joined the organization in 1994.
Southern African Customs Union (SACU). SACU was founded in 1910 with the
participation of  South Africa,  and the so-called BLNS states, namely Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia  and Swaziland. Namibia formally joined in 1990 after gaining political independence
but as an administered territory by South Africa was always a member of the union.  It is the
oldest and the most integrated regional bloc in SSA.
The Cross-Border Initiative  (CBI).  The CBI was borne at the Masstricht Conference on
Africa in 1990 and is sponsored by four major multilateral organizations, including the African
Development Bank, the IMF, the World Bank and the EU as an effective way of furthering the
overall trade liberalization in Africa. This aim is to be achieved by encouraging the
participating countries to converge toward a relatively moderate level of external protection
while liberalizing internal trade among CBI partners. So far fourteen countries have endorsed
the Initiative. These are Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia,
Rwanda,  Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Bilateral Trade Agreements In Southern Africa. Other than the major groupings thus far
considered, there exists a number of bilateral trade agreements, mainly between the Republic of
South Africa on the one hand, and several of the regional countries on the other. Among the
regional bilateral agreements involving South Africa, 28 the main ones are those with
Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozambique. The agreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe
dates back to 1964. South Africa's agreements with Malawi and Mozambique involve unilateral
tariff concessions by South Africa on some imports from the latter. Finally, there are two free
trade agreements between Zimbabwe and Botswana  and Zimbabwe and Namibia.
Asia, Middle  East and North Africa
Unlike Latin America and Africa, there are relatively few trade integration schemes in
Asia, none of which,  it is argued here, has been effective in terms affecting the trade
orientation of its members. Even in the case of the two major schemes in Asia  --the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)--
the initial motivation for their formation was more political than promotion of trade, even
though in the course of time there has been a systematic move towards deeper economic
integration.  The two principal regional schemes, ASEAN and GCC, are briefly reviewed
29 below. Other regional initiatives  --among which the Economic Cooperation Council,  the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation,3 0 the Arab Common Market31 and the
28 For the role of South  Africa in  the sub-region  see Kanji (1996).  For bilateral  agreement  with
Zimbabwe  see World  Bank (1995).
29 Currently  encompassing  Afghanistan,  Iran, Pakistan,  Turkey  and the newly  independent
Central Asian  countries  of Azerbaijan,  Kazakistan,  Kyrgyz  Republic,  Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan  and Uzbekistan
30 Bangladesh,  Bhutan,  India, Maldives,  Nepal, Pakistan,  Sri Lanka.Maghreb Union, 32--  are more cooperation agreements than preferential trade arrangements and
as such are not discussed any further in this paper.
ASEAN.34  ASEAN was created in 1967 with the participation of  Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Brunei joined the association in 1984, shortly after
gaining independence. Vietnam joined the Association in July 1995. Its initial objective was to
foster peaceful national development of its member states through cooperation. In 1977 a
limited program of preferential trade arrangements (PTA) was first adopted by ASEAN
member states., followed in January  1992, by an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).  Although
the share of both intra-ASEAN import and export trade has increased since AFTA's  creation, it
is hardly a result attributable to ASEAN's  free trade arrangement since the intensity of intra-
ASEAN trade actually declines over the same period.  5  In this study ASEAN is not considered
to be an effective trade promoting regional organization.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).-6 GCC was established in May 1981 by
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Although
events in the region played an important role in the creation of GCC, the member countries did
have a long history of informal cooperation.  The rules governing economic integration of
GCC partners were spelt out in the so-called Unified Economic Agreement (EA).  The
agreement foresaw the creation of a common market with free movement of goods and factors
and a conunon external tariff of 4-20 percent on goods originating in third countries. So far,
with few exceptions, barriers on trade among GCC members have been substantially removed,
but the CET has not yet been introduced. However, the free trade agreement among the GCC
countries does not appear to have had much impact on the relative share of their mutual trade.
In fact, data in Tables 1-3 show that for the GCC as a whole, both intra-bloc trade shares and
trade intensity indices have been declining over time. This outcome is mostly attributable to the
similarity in their production and trade structure as well as to their relatively modest protection
against the rest of the world
31Formed  in 1964,  it comprises  Egypt,  Iraq,  Jordan,  Mauritania,  Syria  and Yemen  and  was.
32 This comprises  Algeria,  Libya,  Morocco,  Tunisia  and Mauritania  and was established  in 1989.
33 For a brief summary  see Harmsen  and Leidy,  op. cit.
34 See Edwards eta]  (1996); ASEAN Secretariat (1995a)  and (1995b); Panagariya (1993);
Frankel and Wei (1996)
35 See also  Frankel and Wei, op. cit.
36 For a historical  perspective  see Peterson  (1988)  and Ramazani  (1988).  For a recent  evaluation
of the economies of GCC members see Sassanpour (1996).
37see  Ramazani,  op. cit. p. 6.
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-24-Table 1. Total Intra-group import trade as percentage
of total imports, non fuel trade, 1965-95
1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-95  1995
LAC
Andean Group  1.30  2.01  2.42  3.07  3.40  7.25  10.16
CACM  21.07  22.74  19.86  20.32  11.96  12.64  14.43
CARICOM*  3.33  4.02  3.97  5.97  4.58  4.61  2.7
LAIA/Lafta  8.39  8.23  9.76  10.62  11.81  12.36  13.57
MERCOSUR  12.64  8.70  9.79  '13.25  15.74  19.32  18.29
Mexico/NAFTA +  64.86  65.12  65.10  67.98  69.20  72.51  76.00
Group of Three  0.87  1.18  1.67  1.42  1.44  2.25  3.25
EURO-Mediterranean Agreements +
EGYPT  32.26  30.59  40.62  43.27  40.60  37.70  34.58
ISRAEL  50.02  55.07  49.21  49.07  55.81  53.30  52.06
JORDAN  34.46  31.15  42.89  41.41  37.02  35.27  35.67
LEBANON  43.25  47.14  54.26  na  na  na  na
MOROCCO  61.32  62.13  66.22  62.75  61.81  62.03  59.34
TUNISIA  58.20  64.98  70.14  68.37  68.72  72.34  72.31
TURKEY  50.88  56.27  55.71  49.71  50.49  51.43  50.35
Israel/US FTA+  26.32  21.73  24.83  25.66  20.05  19.58  20.00
Asia
ASEAN  13.70  11.23  11.02  10.95  13.35  14.76  15.81
GCC**  n.a.  2.33  4.80  2.00  4.19  na  5.0




CEAO/UEMOA  5.20  5.49  5.13  6.75  6.74  8.83  8.91
UDEAC  1.88  4.21  3.17  2.27  2.84  4.23  4.43
PTAICOMESA  7.92  7.32  4.54  4.76  4.38  5.00  6.22
SADCC/SADC  8.57  3.87  1.81  3.10  3.22  3.32  4.32
CBI  10.22  9.95  5.42  5.26  5.10  5.81  6.72
Notes:
*  African and CARICOM figures refer to total trade trade
**The  figure for 1995 refers to 1993
+ The import/export shares and intensity refer to The developing partner only and not to all partners.
Source: COMTRADE data base or all countries except Africa and CARICOM. IMF's DOT for the
latter.
-25-Table 2. Total Intra-group export trade as percentage
of total exports, non fuel trade, 1965-95
1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-95  1995
LAC
Andean  Group  2.20  3.47  6.82  7.91  6.51  13.18  17.83
CACM  22.61  24.41  21.10  22.52  14.55  19.30  17.64
CARICOM*  5.22  5.96  3.89  4.90  5.45  6.37  3.72
LAIA  7.55  9.10  11.26  9.94  8.68  12.96  15.14
MERCOSUR  9.00  8.45  8.77  7.92  7.14  14.97  19.67
Mexico/NAFTA  +  62.85  68.79  62.41  68.70  78.62  84.71  87.08
Group  of Three  1.69  2.68  5.16  4.14  2.65  3.95  4.02
EURO-Mediterranean Agreements +
EGYPT  16.88  14.38  20.16  34.64  38.33  42.25  46.71
ISRAEL  43.27  40.11  39.27  36.61  31.95  32.61  31.21
JORDAN  5.23  0.16  3.06  2.88  6.47  4.17  6.17
LEBANON  13.33  11.29  6.84  na  na  na  na
MOROCCO  73.24  69.19  65.11  59.81  59.53  62.74  61.16
TUNISIA  56.69  61.54  70.07  69.89  70.39  76.18  77.95
TURKEY  47.56  49.11  49.58  35.47  43.63  49.55  49.12
IsraelUS  FTA+  16.78  18.45  17.43  23.18  32.22  30.48  30.12
Asia
ASEAN  22.25  19.22  17.53  18.20  17.01  20.33  23.22
GCC**  na  39.09  33.00  23.34  20.85  na  20.0




CEAO/UEMOA  6.36  8.86  9.46  10.12  8.60  10.80  8.91
UDEAC  1.92  3.97  2.31  1.69  3.00  2.21  2.32
PTA/COMESA  7.21  7.786  7.566  6.992  5.298  6.5  7.78
SADCC/SADC  6.07  3.09  2.51  3.55  3.13  3.78  4.68
CBI  8.26  10.20  7.89  7.52  6.40  8.36  6.72
Notes:
*  African and CARICOM figures refer to total trade trade
**  The figure for 1995 refers to 1993
+ The import/export shares and intensity refer to The developing partner only and not to all partners.
Source: COMTRADE data base or all countries except Africa and CARICOM. IMF's DOT for the latter.
-26-Table 3. Export Trade Intensity of various regional or bilateral
groupings with each other; 1965-95, non-fuel trade
1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-95  1995
LAC
Andean Group  1.3  2.8  4.4  5.9  7.8  17.4  21.5
CACM  42.7  58.6  49.6  70.5  64.5  100.8  147.4
CARICOM*  8.8  9.8  5.9  11.0  17.2  27.9  18.6
LAIA  2.2  2.6  3.3  3.4  4.0  4.3  3.8
MERCOSUR  6.1  4.5  5.3  6.7  8.6  13.3  12.0
Mexico/NAFTA+  3.1  3.6  3.6  3.5  3.4  4.3  4.4
Group of Three  0.80  1.52  2.48  1.80  1.79  1.83  1.83
EURO-Mediterranean Agreements+
EGYPT  0.4  0.3  0.5  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.3
ISRAEL  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.8
JORDAN  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2
LEBANON  0.3  0.3  0.2  na  na  na  na
MOROCCO  1.7  1.6  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6
TUNISIA  1.3  1.4  1.7  1.8  1.7  1.9  2.1
TURKEY  1.1  1.1  1.2  0.9  1.1  1.2  1.3
IsraelUS  FTA+  1.1  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.7  1.9  1.9
Asia
ASEAN  8.4  7.1  5.7  4.5  4.7  3.4  3.2
GCC**  na  85.9  17.0  5.7  11.9  na  11.4
Australia-NewZealand  2.2  3.1  3.6  3.6  4.4  5.9  6.7
AFRICA*
ECOWAS
CEAO/UEMOA  19.3  30.0  30.1  36.1  38.7  64.6  49.7
UDEAC  9.9  25.3  14.0  10.6  23.0  25.8  30.2
PTAICOMESA  6.4  8.8  13.9  11.8  10.7  15.6  19.9
SADCC/SADC  9.1  6.1  12.1  13.3  13.9  18.6  25.9
CBI  10.8  17.2  18.2  18.9  19.4  28.8  24.0
Notes:
*  African and CARICOM figures refer to total trade trade
**  The figure for 1995 refers to
1993
+ The import/export shares and intensity refer to The developing partner only and not to all partners.
Source: COMTRADE data base fro all countries except Africa. IMF's DOT for Africa and CARICOM.
-27-Table 4. Total World  Exports  to African  Regional Groupings
As Percentage  of Total World  Exports
Non-fuel trade,  1965-95
1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-95  1995
SADCC  0.67  0.50  0.21  0.27  0.23  0.20  0.18
CEAO  0.33  0.30  0.31  0.28  0.22  0.17  0.18
PTA  1.13  0.89  0.54  0.59  0.50  0.42  0.39
ECOWAS
CBI  0.76  0.59  0.43  0.40  0.33  0.29  0.28
Total  2.89  2.28  1.50  1.54  1.27  1.08  1.03
Source: COMTRADE  data base
-28-Table 5. continued: Average tariff and other charges in  various
countries divided by regionimembership in an effective RTA
Unweighted Average  MFN tariff  Number  Total
Most  Maximum  of Tariff  Other
1978-80  1981-85  1986-90  1991-94  recent  <-year  Tariff++  Bands  Charges++
I  II  III  IV  V  VI  X  Xi  XII
G. Africa
G.  1  Countries  that are not members  of an effective PTA
Benin  na  48.3  41.2  40.6  11.1  96  20  4  3
Ethiopia  na  29.0  29.6  na  28.8  95  80  10  na
Ghana  na  33.3  18.8  17.0  15.0  95  25  3  na
Guinea  76.4  76.4  10.0  na  13.0  90  na  na  na
Kenya  na  41.0  40.3  29.9  19.9  95  35  4  na
Malawi  21.9  19.4  18.0  na  21.0  94  45  11  01100
Mali  na  na  na  na  23.0  94  40/100  3  0110
Mauritania  na  24.6  22.3  na  31.4  95  268  17  0/80
Mauritius  na  36.2  36.3  na  29.0  95  80  na  na
Nigeria  na  33.8  31.0  34.6  35.0  95  100  na  >7
Sierra Leone  na  25.8  30.9  na  21.0  95  40  3/5  na
Tanzania  na  23.9  30.0  33.0  27.5  94  40  5  na
Uganda  na  na  25.0  na  17.1  95  30  4  na
Simp. Aver.  na  35.6  27.8  31.0  22.5
G.2  Countries possibly  belonging to an effective RTA
Cameroon **  28.3  28.3  32.0  18.8  18.1  96  30  4  1/20
Cote d'lvoire  26.4  27.7  26.1  23.6  20.0  95  35  6  3
Senegal  na  5.0  13.5  12.3  35.7  95  70  5  na
South Africa  na  29.0  22.0  17.0  21.0  94  100+  >35  5/40
Zimbabwe  na  10.0  9.2  17.2  21.8  97  100  >3  15/20
Sim Aver.  na  20.0  20.6  17.8  23.3
Overall Ave.
for Africa  na  30.7  25.6  24.4  22.7
G.3  Countries in state of war
Burundi  37.9  37.9  37.0  na  37.0  88  100
Rwanda  na  na  33.0  42.0  42.0  91  60
Somalia  na  35.0  27.0  na  na  na  na
Sudan  50.6  50.6  49.8  na  na  na  120
Zaire  na  23.7  22.6  na  na  na  na
Notes:
**  =  Cameroon's  numbers apply to all UDEAC.
@  =  Weighted  average  of MFN  tariff  and zero  tariff,  with  weight  equal  to  the  share  of third  countries  and partners  in  total
imports.  This  assumes  zero  tariff  on M  from  partners.
&  =  Share  of imports  from  partner  is the  sum  of US  (20%)  and EU  (53%)  share  in total  Israel  M.
*  =  Indicates  a recent  effective  RTA,  i.e  effective  after  1990;
&&  =  Indicates  effectiveness  in  the early  years,  i.e  in  the late  1960s
+ +  =  When  two  maximum  rates  are  given,  the  first  refers  to the  normal  maximum  and  the  second  to  the rate  applicable  to
selected  items  only.
na  Not  available
NIA  =  Not  applicable
-29-Table S. Average tariff  and other charges  in  various
countries divided by region/membership in an effective RTA
Share  of
Unweiehtcd  Average MFN tariff  partners  ost  recen  Max  No. of  Total
Most  in total M  Overall  tariff +  Tariff  Other  Mean  Total Charg  NTB Coverage
1978-80  1981-85  1986-90 1991-9  recent  year  1995  tariff@  Bands  Charges  84-87  '91-93  84-87  '91-93
I  11  lIt  IV  V  Vt  Vtll  IX  X  Xl  XII  Xtil  XIV  XV  XVI
A. Latin America
A.1  Countries that  are members  of an effective  RTA
Argentina  - na  31.5  24.6  10.8  9.9  95  0.23  7.6  20  8  10  40  19.4  32  0.2
Bolivia  na  12.1  18.4  9.9  9.7  95  0.08  8.9  10  3  4  20  10  25  2
Brazil  44.0  48.2  42.0  20.2  11.1  95  0.14  9.5  20  13  6  80  15.4  35  1.5
Colombia  na  61.0  28.9  14.8  13.3  95  0.10  12.0  20  4  0  79  12  73  1.7
Costa  Rica  &&  na  21.1  18.8  13.1  11.7  94  0.13  10.2  20127  5  1  na  na  na  na
Ecuador  *  a  na  34.3  9.3  12.3  95  0.16  10.3  20  9  1-2  49  11  59  na
El Salvador  &&  na  na  20.0  13.1  9.2  94  0.42  5.3  20/30  5  na  na  na  na  na
Guatemala  &&  na  na  19.4  na  10.8  94  0.32  7.3  20/25  5  0  na  na  na  na
Nicaragua  &&  na  na  22.1  8.0  10.7  95  0.16  9.0  na  na  5-10  na  na  na  na
Paraguay  C  11.2  11.1  10.9  15.4  9.3  95  0.36  6.0  20  na  na  na  na  na  na
Peru  29.0  29.3  41.0  17.1  17.6  95  0.09  16.0  25  2  na  na  na  na  na
Uruguay  na  42.5  29.9  18.9  9.3  95  0.46  5.0  20  3  0  na  na  na  na
Venezuela  na  28.0  28.9  16.0  13.4  95  0.09  12.2  20  4  0  33  17  44  2,4
Mexico  Ila  24.8  13.9  13.3  12.6  95  0.76  3.0  25  4  1  16  17  13  4
Unweighted  Average  na  31.0  25.2  13.8  11.5  8.7  45.3  14.5  40.1  2.0
A.2  Countries nat member  of  an effective RTA
Bahamas  29.8  31.1  na  na  32.0  85  NIA  NA  ena  na  na  na  na  na  na
Chile  na  27.5  17.0  11.0  11.0  95  N/A  N/A  11  na  na  na  na  10  0.2
Guyana  na  na  18.7  na  20.0  89  N/A  N/A  na  na  na  na  na  na  na
Haiti-  na  27.7  11.6  na  na  na  N/A  N/A  na  na  na  na  na  na  na
Jamaica  na  17.0  28.9  19.8  19.3  94  N/A  N/A  30/40  7  20/50  na  na  na  na
Trinidad & Tobago  na  na  17.2  na  18.7  95  N/A  N/A  na  na  na  na  na  na  na
Unweighted Average  na  25.8  18.7  15.4  20.2  na  na  na  na
B. Countries  belonging  to a North-South RTA
Mexico  na  24.8  13.9  13.3  12.6  95  0.76  3.0  25  4  1  16  17  13  4
Israel  &  na  8.0  7.1  8.3  8.3  93  0.73  2.2  na  na  na  na  na  na  na
Turkey  na  28.9  26.9  9.0  9  93  0.50  4.5  na  na  na  42  25  na  na
Unweighted Average  na  20.6  16.0  10.2  10.0  2.6  na  na  na  na
C. South Asia
Bangladesh  na  99.9  92.7  60.5  42.0  94  N/A  N/A  75/100  10  3  na  na  na  na
China  na  49.5  39.3  37.5  36.3  94  N/A  N/A  220  na  na  na  na  na  na
India  na  74.3  92.7  50.4  47.8  94  N/A  N/A  85/100  >10  143  95  100  53
Nepal  na  22.1  21.8  16.1  16.7  95  N/A  N/A  40/110  7  na  22.6  16.1  10.7  0.7
Pakistan  na  77.2  66.7  61.0  51.0  95  N/A  N/A  265  10  12  88  73  83  14.5
Sri Lanka  na  36.2  27.2  25.6  24.0  95  N/A  N/A  250  4  3  40.5  29  14  4
Average  S. Asia  Da  59.9  56.7  41.8  36.3  73.5  53.3  51.9  18.1
D. East Asia
Hong Kong  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  94  N/A  N/A  na  na  na  na  na  na
Indonesia  29.0  31.0  23.9  19.1  19.4  94  N/A  N/A  200  na  18.2  20.1  95  3
Korea  na  23.1  16.3  10.1  7.9  94  NIA  N/A  30  na  25  12  9  3
Malaysia  na  10.6  14.1  13.4  14.3  94  N/A  N/A  105  10  14.3  17.6  3.7  2.1
Philippines  41.4  32.2  27.8  24.3  20.0  95  N/A  N/A  50/100  na  na  na  na  na
Singapore  na  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  94  NIA  N/A  na  na  na  ta  na  na
Thailand  na  36.8  40.8  37.8  23.3  95  N/A  N/A  100  na  41.2  37.8  12.4  5.5
Taiwan  na  29.8  14.8  na  11.2  94  NIA  NIA  na  na  na  na  na  na
Aver.  East  Asia  na  20.5  17.3  15.0  12  24.7  21.9  30.0  3.4
" minus  HK &  Singapore  27.2  23.0  20.9  16
E. Middle East/North  Africa
Lebanon  na  na  na  na  15.4  96  0.48  8.0  na  na  na  na  na  na  na
Jordan  15.9  14.3  15.9  17.6  20.5  92  0.36  13.1  na  na  na  ela  iia  na  na
Syria  na  14.8  12.9  na  11.0  90  N/A  N/A  na  na  na  27.5  na  36.6  ela
Yemen  na  26.0  16.2  na  16.0  87  NIA  NA  na  na  na  na  na  na  n  na
Algeria  44.4  29.6  24.6  22.9  24.8  93  NIA  NIA  60  tia  eia  26.1  25  68  9.5
Egypt  na  47.4  39.7  42.2  28.3  95  0.35  18.4  800  na  na  54  tia  48  na
Libya  13.3  14.4  22.7  na  na  na  NIA  NIA  na  na  na  35  na  10  na
Morocco  na  37.5  22.6  22.8  24.4  94  0.60  9.8  45  na  na  36.1  iia  27.6  na
Tunisia  23.8  26.3  25.8  27.6  27.0  94  0.72  7.6  41/123  na  na  27.4  30.6  na  na
Aver.  MidEast  24.4  26.3  22.5  26.6  21.7  12.2  34.4  27.8  38.0  9.5
F. OPEC Coutnries
Bahrain  na  1.7  5.1  na  3.0  90  V/A  NIA  na  ta  ela  ia  Ila  na  tia
Kuwait  ns  3.7  4.2  na  4.2  86  NIA  NIA  na  tta  iia  la  na  na  ei
Qatar  na  1.8  4.6  an  5.0  90  N/A  N/A  na  nia  iia  iia  na  iia  na
Oman  na  1.5  3.0  na  5.7  94  NIA  N/A  100  na  na  na  tna  a  eia
Saudi  Arabia /a.o  1.9  2.2  8.0  12.1  12.2  95  N/A  NIA  ina  ia  na  iia  iia  nia  iia
United Arab Emirates  na  1.2  4.5  na  4.5  86  NIA  N/A  na  iia  tia  ita  iia  tia  ia
Aver. OPEC  na  2.0  4.9  na  5.8
-30-sources for Table 5
*  Columns I-IV: personal communication from Francis Ng, reflecting data from a variety of sources.
*  Columns V: For  the majority of countries in all regions but Africa, the sources is Ulrich Reineke:
"Advantages and disadvantages of uniform tariff structures for developing countries",  mimeo,  1996,
IECIT, using UNCTAD's  TRAINS data base.  When the source is Reinekie, the latest year  is
normally  1995. For a few countries for which 1995 data were unavailble, the source is IMF (1994):
International Trade Policies,  7he Uruguay Round and Beyond,  vol 2, Table 6, p. 48. These reflect
data available by 1994. Finally, for a few countries for which the latest information refers to 1996 or
beyond, the source is staff estimates of IECIT, based on customs data collected for the specific
country. This is the case for Cameroon, Benin, Zimbabwe, and Lebanon. For the latter the source is
Will Martin (1996): 'Assessing the Implications for Lebanon of Free  Trade with the European
Union".  For the African countries, the source for column V (as well as for columns X-XII) is
estimates by IMF staff based on a number of different sources.
*  Column VIII is computed from data in COMTRADE data base and shows the share of partners in total
non-fuel imports of countries that are classified as belonging to an effective RTA.
Column IX is a weighted average of the most recent MFN tariff in column V and naught (assuming
trade among parmers in an "effective" regional grouping to be completely duty-free) with weights
representing the share of the rest of the world and partners in the indicated country's  total imports.
*  Columns X-XII are also based on IMF (1994), op. cit. and/or Reineke,  op. cit.
Columns XIII-XVI are based on UNCTAD (1994):  Directory of Trade Regimes, Geneva.
-3  1-Table  6: Uruguay  Round  Liberalization  Indicators  of Trade  regime  in Developing  Countries
Post UR  Pre-UR  Post-UR  Post-UR  GATT-Bound  % of imports  Most  recent
applied  rate.  bound  rate  bound  rate  Bound  rate  Post-UR  bound  above  average  tar.
sim.  aver.  IMF  1/  IMF1/  sim.  aver.  all goods  applied  rate  sim.  aver  <-(year)
weighted  weighted
I  II  IlIl  IV  V  VI  VIl  Vill
a. Countries  that  are member  of an effective  RTA
Argentina  11.3  38.2  30.9  30.9  100  99.8  9.9  1995
Brazil  15.6  40.7  27  29.5  100  71.8  11.1  1995
Colombia  11.4  44.3  35.3  35.5  100  97.6  13.3  1995
costa  rica  54.9  44.1  11.7  1994
El Salvador  13.5  34.5  30.6  37.4  97.8  96.8  9.2  1994
Mexico  13.4  46.1  33.7  34.7  100  97.5  12.6  1995
Peru  15.9  34.8  29.4  29.7  100  98.3  17.6  1995
Uruguay  9.4  20.9  30.9  30.7  100  84.9  9.3  1995
Venezuela  15.3  50  31.1  33.3  100  89.9  13.4  1995
Average  13.2  40.5  32.6  32.7  12.0
% reduction  in bound  rates  -19.6
b. Countries  that  are members  of  a semi-effective  RTA
Australia  10.4  20.1  12.2  12.1  97.2  30.1  9.8  1993
New  Zealand  10.0  23.8  11.9  14.2  100.0  42.3  8.8  1993
Senegal  12.8  15.9  58.3  25.4  35.7  95
Zimbabwe  9.2  48.6  14.7  5.9  21.8  97
Simp. Aver.  10.6  22.0  12.1  22.7  67.6  19.0
c. Countries  that  are not members  of an  effective  FTAs
Chile  11  34.9  24.9  25  100  99.7  11.0  1995
Hong  Kong  0  0  0  0  27.9  0  0.0  1994
Jamaica  19.6  16.5  50  54.9  100  100  na  na
India  45  71.4  32.4  41.4  58.5  16.5  56.3  1992
Indonesia  18.3  20.4  36.9  39.4  93.4  88.5  19.4  1994
Korea  11.5  18  8.3  13.3  83.2  5.7  9  1992
Macao  0  0  0  0  20.8  0  na  na
Malaysia  13  10  9.1  16.3  77.4  30.6  14.3  1994
Philippines  24.4  23.9  22.5  24.5  60.6  16.6  20.0  1995
Singapore  1.3  0.4  5.1  7.1  66  43.9  0.5  1994
Sri Lanka  26  28.6  28.1  35.9  26.7  9.3  24.1  1995
Thailand  27.6  35.8  28.1  26.8  64.3  8.3  23.1  1995
Tunisia  27.6  28.3  40.2  45.7  67.9  46  30.0  1992
Turkey  na  25.1  22.3  19.3  45.1  3.2  9.5  1993
Simp.  Average  17.3  22.4  22.0  25.0  63.7  18.1
"-HK,  Macao  & Sin  22.4  21.7
% reduction  in bound  rate, IMF  = 0
Source:
Col. i-iii and colums  v-vi from M. Finger  et al. (1995): The  Uruguay  Round: tatistics  on Tariff  Concessions  Given  and  Received;
Col. ii-iii, IMF;  col  vii and  viii, Table  5
-32-Table  7: The Evolution of Openness In Various Countries
Openness  = (Total  Exports+Imports  minus  fuels) I GDP
196549  1970-74  1976-79  1980-44  198549  1990-94
A. Latin America
I. Countries belonging to an effective RTA
Argentina  0.09  0.10  0.16  0.15  0.12  0.11
Bolivia  0.35  0.41  0 56  0.37  0.26  0.36
Brazil  0.09  0.12  0.13  0.13  0.12  0.13
Colombia  0.18  0.21  0.25  0.20  0.22  0.29
Costa Rica  0.48  0.52  0.56  0.57  0.53  0.62
Ecuador  0.25  0.31  0.32  0.21  0.27  0.36
El Salvador  0.41  0.45  0.56  0.37  0.36  0.30
Guatemala  0.30  0.31  0.36  0.26  0.27  0.31
Nicaragua  na  na  na  na  na  na
Paraguay  0.42  0.36  0.38  0.17  0.19  0.27
Peru  0.25  0.21  0.23  0.20  0.21  0.19
Uruguay  0.44  0.48  0.34  0.44  0.41
Venezuela  0.15  0.16  0.22  0.14  0.19  0.24
Mexico  0.10  0.09  0.10  0.12  0.18  0.27
Sim. Aver.  0.24  0.28  0.33  0.25  0.26  0.30
Sim. Aver.- Mex.  0.25  0.30  0.35  0.26  0.26  0.30
II. Countries not meber of an effective RTA
Bahamas  0.47  2.16  8.06  4.28  2.06  1.11
Guyana  0.97  1.02  1.27  1.13  1.06  1.71
Jamaica  0.54  0.57  0.61  0.76  0.68  0.83
Trinidad  & Tobago  1.18  1.33  1.23  0.81  0.56  0.64
Sim. Aver.  0.79  1.27  2.79  1.74  1.09  1.07
Countries belonging to an effective North-South RTA
Mexico  0.10  0.09  0.10  0.12  0.18  0.27
Israel  0.36  0.37  0.50  0.46  0.49  0.47
Turkey  0.10  0.13  0.11  0.19  0.25  0.22
South Asia
Bangladesh  na  na  0.16  0.18  0.17  0.20
China  na  na  na  0.21  0.31  0.39
India  0.08  0.07  0.10  0.09  0.10  0.13
Nepal  0.04  0.09  0.15  0.19  0.22
Pakistan  0.22  0.20  0.23  0.23  0.25  0.29
Sri  Lanka  0.36  0.27  0.40  0.48  0.45  0.57
Simple Av.  0.22  0.14  0.20  0.22  0.25  0.30
East Asia
Hong Kong  1.15  1.08  1.17  1.23  1.44  1.45
Indonesia  0.15  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.24  0.33
Korea  0.28  0.41  0.50  0.54  0.56  0.47
Malaysia  0.63  0.62  0.70  0.72  0.88  1.35
Philippines  0.24  0.31  0.34  0.32  0.35  0.47
Singapore  1.75  1.61  2.13  2.24  2.52  2.51
Thailand  0.29  0.29  0.35  0.37  0.49  0.64
Taiwan  0.39  0.33  0.84
Simple Av.  0.61  0.60  0.77  0.80  0.93  1.01
" minus HK & Singapore  0.33  0.36  0.42  0.43  0.50  0.68
"minus  HK, Sing, Mal.  0.27  0.31  0.34  0.35  0.41  0.55
Middle East and North Africa
Jordan  na  na  na  0.58  0.51  0.72
Syria  na  na  na  na  na  na
Yemen  na  na  na  na  na  na
Algera  0.30  0.29  0.32  0.23  0.14  0.19
Egypt  0.23  0.23  0.39  0.37  0.25  0.28
Libya  na  na  na  na  na  na
Morocco  0.29  0.30  0.35  0.34  0.34  0.35
Tunisia  0.32  0.31  0.43  0.47  0.50  0.62
Simple Av.  0.29  0.28  0.37  0.40  0.35  0.43
-33-Table 7 Continued: The Evolution of Openness in Various  Countries
Openness  = (Total  Exports+lmports  minus  fuels) / GDP
1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94
Gulf Oil Countries
Bahrain  na  na  na  0.58  0.59  0.79
Kuwait  na  0.18  0.33  0.41  0.31  0.31
Qatar  na  0.20  0.29  0.29  0.33
Oman  na  0.32  0.33  0.32  0.38
Saudi Arabia  na  0.14  0.20  0.28  0.30  0.26
United Arab Emirates  na  0.41  0.27  0.33  0.37
Simple Av.  na  0.17  0.31  0.37  0.36  0.40
Africa
Benin  0.20  0.30  0.35  0.38  0.30  0.24
Ethiopia  na  na  na  0.22  0.20  0.16
Ghana  na  na  na  na  na  na
Guinea  na  na  na  na  na  na
Kenya  0.42  0.45  0.50  0.45  0.37  0.46
Madagascar  0.27  0.26  0.29  0.23  0.25  0.28
Malawi  0.45  0.50  0.57  0.49  0.51  0.57
Mauritania  0.45  0.68  0.00  0.55  0.90  0.92
Mauritius  0.56  0.71  0.85  0.80  1.03  0.98
Nigeria  na  na  na  na  na  na
Sierra Leone  na  na  na  na  na  na
Tanzania  na  na  na  0.24  0.24  0.47
Uganda  0.31  na  na  0.28  0.15  0.19
Simp. Aver.  0.38  0.48  0.43  0.40  0.44  0.48
Countries belonging to an effective PTA
Cameroon  0.34  0.37  0.41  0.31  0.23  0.29
Cote d'lvoire  0.57  0.57  0.59  0.60  0.55  0.58
Senegal  0.38  0.45  0.58  0.63  0.45  0.32
South Africa  na  na  na  na  na  na
Zimbabwe  0.19  na  na  0.33  0.41  0.60
Sim Aver.  0.37  0.47  0.52  0.47  0.41  0.45
Countries In state of war
Burundi  0.19  0.20  0.28  0.26  0.27  0.32
Rwanda  0.20  0.24  0.28  0.27  0.22  0.26
Somalia  na  na  na  na  na  na
Sudan  0.29  0.29  0.24  0.26  0.13  0.23
Zaire  0.16  0.23  0.14  0.00  0.16  na
Sim. Aver.  0.21  0.24  0.24  0.20  0.20  0.27
Notes: * Data refer  to total trade, including  fuel.
Sources: BESD  for GNP and COMTRADE  data  base and IMF's DOT  for trade data.
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